INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Hensley,' the United States Supreme Court held that when law enforcement officers have a reasonable suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts, that a suspect is wanted in connection with a completed felony, the officers may stop and investigate that person. 2 The Court in Hensley derived its holding from the landmark case of Terry v. Ohio, 3 which held that the police may stop a person and briefly detain him if the officers have a reasonable suspicion that the person is involved in criminal activity. 4 The Hensley Court thus expanded the Terry decision to encompass the investigation of any person who is suspected of being involved in completed criminal activity.
The Court in Hensley also held that if a flyer has been issued on the basis of articulable facts, grounded in a reasonable suspicion that the person sought has committed a criminal offense, then officers in a neighboring department may rely on the flyer. 5 This reliance justifies the officers' stop of the person to check identification and ask him questions, and the officer may briefly detain the person while attempting to elicit additional information. 6 This Note will examine the reasoning that underlies the Court's willingness to extend the Terry decision to include the investigation of completed felonies and to foster interdepartmental reliance. In addition, this Note will argue that the Supreme Court's decision in Hensley is justified in light of the compelling governmental interests of bringing at large offenders to justice.
II. BACKGROUND
The fourth amendment guarantees an individual the right to be secure in his home and property against unreasonable searches and seizures, 7 and provides that no warrants shall be issued against an individual, unless grounded in probable cause. 8 In Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court carved out a narrow exception to the fourth amendment's probable cause standard. 9 The Court held that a law enforcement officer may stop, search, and detain briefly for questioning an individual whom the officer has a reasonable suspicion to believe is connected with criminal activity.' 0 The Court noted, however, that the officer must be able to justify his intrusion by citing to "specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion."" 1 The Court noted that while there is no hard and fast rule for determining the reasonableness of a search and seizure, a balancing test must be employed to weigh the need to perform the search aganst the individual's right to be free from intrusion. [tihe rights of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. Id.
Id.
9 Teny, 392 U.S. at 27. 10 Id. at 30. The issue in Teny was whether guns seized during an officer's brief onthe-spot "stop and frisk" of three men suspected by the officer of contemplating a robbery should be admitted into evidence at trial. Id. at 12. The prosecution argued that the guns should be admitted into evidence because the arresting officer had probable cause to arrest the suspects prior to his pat-down search, thereby making the guns' seizure incidental to a lawful arrest. Although the trial court rejected this notion, it denied the defendants' motion to suppress the guns from evidence, reasoning that the officer's law enforcement experience gave him "reasonable cause" to believe that the defendants' conduct was suspicious and required further investigation. The trial court held that since the officer had reasonable cause to believe that the men may have been contemplating a felony and may have been armed, his pat-down search was "essential to the proper performance of the officer's investigatory duties," and helped to insure his own protection. Id. at 7-8. Therefore, the court ruled that the discovery of a loaded gun during a "stop and frisk" was admissible into evidence. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. Id. at 8.
11 Id. at 21. Moreover, the Supreme Court stated that it would be unreasonable to preclude an offcer from taking necessary measures to ascertain whether, in fact, an individual is armed, if the officer is justified in believing that the individual is armed and poses a potential threat to the officer's safety. 18 the Court attempted to define the circumstances that evoke a reasonable suspicion on the part of an investigating officer making a Terry-like stop.' 9 The Court in Cortez noted that the common theme enunciated by various courts that have interpreted the Terry "reasonableness" standard is the idea that the officer must derive his reasonable suspicion from the "totality of the circumstances. ' 20 Implicit in this derivation process are two elements, each of which must be present before a stop is permissible. 2 1 First, the officer must make an assessment based on all the circumstances leading to the stop, including his objective observations, information from police reports, and a consideration of the behavior patterns associated with certain categories of criminals. 2 2 Second, the product of the officer's analysis must raise a suspicion that the individual being stopped is engaged in wrong-doing. 23 The Court used this two-step reasonableness analysis to hold that the information acquired by two border patrol 13 407 U.S. 143 (1972 of a gun protruding from under the passenger seat. 33 A search of Hensley's car by the officers revealed two more firearms, and both Hensley and Green were placed under arrest. 34 At trial, Hensley argued that the guns were inadmissible evidence because they were obtained during an illegal search. 3 5 He also argued that the St. Bernard police, by their own admission, believed that they lacked probable cause to arrest based on the informant's statement, 36 and therefore, that the Covington officers' arrest violated the flyer's directive to detain Hensley "for investigation only." 37 The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, however, ruled that the informant's statement constituted probable cause for Hensley's arrest. 38 The court, therefore, admitted the guns into evidence and convicted Hensley for violating a federal statute prohibiting the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. 43 The Sixth Circuit, therefore, concluded that the illegality of 33 Id. 34 Id. Immediately after finding the gun, the officers searched for other weapons in a jacket lying between the two front seats and an open gym bag on the back seat. The officers found a handgun wrapped in the jacket and another in the gym bag. All three guns were loaded. The gym bag also contained hypodermic needles, ski masks, a change of clothing and a controlled substance. Brief for Petitioner at 7-8, United States v. Hensley, 105 S. Ct. 675 (1985). 35 Id. at 224. The court also refused to apply the "collective knowledge" doctrine, holding that even if the St. Bernard Police Department had probable cause, this fact would not have imbued the Covington officers with probable cause because the two departments were not directly working together in the investigation. Id. at 223. 43 Id. at 225. The court's holding on this point reads as follows: "we hold that the the Covington officers' arrest precluded the admissibility of the guns seized during the stop.4 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether officers may stop and briefly detain a person, for whom a wanted flyer has been issued, to check whether there is also a warrant outstanding for the person's arrest. 4 5 IV. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
In United States v. Hensley, the Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision 4 6 reversed the court of appeals' holding that the Terry exception is confined to the investigation of imminent or ongoing crimes. 47 The Court in Hensley held that the Terry exception is equally applicable to both the investigation of completed felonies and the investigation of future or ongoing crimes. 48 The Hens/ey court based its conclusion on the opinions given in several earlier cases, Royer stating that in Royer it held that, although the crime being investigated was ongoing, the intrusive nature of the search removed it from the ambit of the Teny exception. 56 Second, the Supreme Court in Hensley declared that Royer was consistent with prior case law that recognized the applicability of the Terry exception to completed crimes. 5 7 The Hensley Court cited Royer for the explict proposition that "Terry created a limited exception to this general rule: certain seizures are justifiable under the Fourth Amendment if there is articulable suspicion that a person has committed or is about to commit a crime." 5 8
The Court in Hensley set forth a balancing test to determine the extent of limitations to be placed on police investigations of completed felonies. 59 That test, based on the fourth amendment's reasonableness standard, weighs the quality and nature of the intrusion of an individual's right to privacy against the government's interest in solving crimes and bringing offenders to justice. 60 The Court held that when a reasonableness analysis is applied to the investigations of completed crimes, probable cause need not always be present to justify an investigation. 61 Accordingly, the Court held that where the police have a "reasonable suspicion grounded in specific and articulable facts" 6 2 that a person they encounter was involved in or is wanted in connection with a completed felony, 63 the strong Court of Appeals) view the 'confinement' in this case went beyond the limited restraint of a Terry investigative stop, and Royer's consent was thus tainted by the illegality, a conclusion that required reversal in the absence of probable cause to arrest. The question before us is whether the record warrants that conclusion. We think that it does. Royer, 460 U.S. at 501. 57 61 Id. The Court stated that the factors in the balance may be different when a stop is made to investigate a completed crime rather than an imminent or ongoing one. In the latter categories, the governmental interests of crime prevention, public safety, and the necessity of action in the midst of exigent circumstances figure prominently in the balance. On the other hand, when an investigaton is made of a completed crime, the Court stated that the dominant governmental interests are solving crimes and bringing offenders to justice. Nevertheless, the Court reasoned that these latter interests are compelling enough to justify brief stops and questioning of individuals suspected by policemen of completed criminal activity. The Court concluded that these interests outweigh the intrusion on the individual's freedom. Id. at 680-81. 62 Id. at 681.
63
Id. The Court declined to extend its holding to include all completed crimes. Rather, it restricted its application only to the most serious crime classification felonies. The Court stated that, " [p] articularly in the context of felonies or crimes involving a governmental interests in apprehending the offender and solving the crime allows the police to make a brief stop of the person for questioning and to check his identification. 64 The Hensley Court then considered the validity of the investigative stop conducted by the Covington officers in reliance on the flyer issued by the St. Bernard Police Department. 65 The Court analogized Hensley to the factually similar case of Whiteley v. Warden, 6 6 in which a Wyoming sheriff obtained an arrest warrant for Whiteley, a suspected burglar, and issued a report over the state's police radio network describing Whiteley, his car, and the stolen property. The report, however, did not specify the evidence underlying the issuing officer's belief that he had sufficient probable cause to arrest Whiteley. 68 Acting in reliance on the report, police officers in another department stopped Whiteley's car, arrested him, and then searched the car. 69 The Supreme Court in Whiteley concluded that because the sheriff lacked probable cause to obtain an arrest warrant, the evidence discovered during the officer's search was inadmissible.
70
The Whiteley Court noted, however, that if the sheriff had probable cause to obtain an arrest warrant, the interdepartmental arrest would have been valid, despite the arresting officer's ignorance of the specific facts supporting the determination of probable cause. 7 1 Thus, the Whiteley Court held that when evidence is discovered during a search incidental to an arrest by officers from a separate department, the evidence is admissible if the department issuing the report had probable cause to make an arrest. 7 2 In accordance with threat to public safety, it is in the public interest that the crime be solved and the suspect detained as promptly as possible." Id.
64 Id. Applying the reasoning to the facts of Hensley, the Supreme Court reasoned that the informant's statement to Officer Davis was sufficient to arouse a reasonable suspicion in Davis that Hensley was involved in an armed robbery. Id. at 683-84. Further, the Court stated that since Hensley was at large from the instant Davis' suspicion arose until he was finally stopped by the Covington police, Hensley's stop and detention at the earliest possible moment was not inconsistent with the principles of the fourth amendment. the Whiteley Court's implicit approval of interdepartmental reliance on warrants issued by other police departments, the Hensley Court stated that in an era when criminals have ready mobility, the notion of interdepartmental reliance is nothing more than the exercise of "common sense" by law enforcement officials. 73 The Court in Hensley, while noting its previous approval of interdepartmental reliance in Whiteley, distinguished Whiteley from Hensley on the basis of the report relayed by the issuing police department. 74 Whereas the report in Whiteley mentioned an arrest warrant, the flyer circulated by the St. Bernard Police Department in Hensley stated that Hensley was only wanted for investigation of a robbery. 75 The Hensley Court determined the relevance of this distinction by referring to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's opinion in United States v. Robinson. 76 In Robinson, the Ninth Circuit applied Whiteley and concluded that if an officer who issues a bulletin has a reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify an investigatory stop, an officer from another department may act in reliance on that bulletin. 7 7 The latter officer need not have personal knowledge of the information or evidence that underlies the issuing officer's reasonable suspicion. 7 8 The Robinson court determined that in such circumstances, interdepartmental reliance serves to promote effective law enforcement. 79 The Hensley Court held that the Ninth Circuit's interdepartmental reliance theory served to promote the same governmental interest that weighed in favor of permitting Terry stops to investigate completed felonies. 8 0 The Supreme Court in Hensley stated that the countervailng interest of security from personal intrusion was minimal by comparison. 8 The Supreme Court's decision in Hensley extends the Teny exception 8 4 to include completed criminal activity. The Hensley decision also enunciates the Court's approval of interdepartmental police cooperation to bring at-large offenders to justice. These extensions of crime-solving procedures currently available to law enforcement officials represent a willingness by the Supreme Court to further the governmental interest of solving past crimes and apprehending felons while safeguarding the rights of citizens as guaranteed by the fourth amendment. 83 Id. at 683. Applying the principle of interdepartmental reliance to the facts of Hensley, the Court reasoned that an objective reading of the St. Bernard flyer contained facts sufficient to indicate to an experienced officer that, if seen, Hensley should be stopped, positively identified, questioned, and informed that he was wanted for questioning by the St. Bernard police. Thus, based on the articulable facts that supported the reasonable suspicion, the Court concluded that a brief stop to ascertain and relate the aforementioned information was not unreasonable. Further, the Court noted that once Hensley was stopped, it was reasonable to assume that an experienced officer would be inclined to check whether a warrant had been issued for Hensley's arrest. The Court, therefore, held that in light of the reasonable suspicion of the issuing department, coupled with an objective reading of the flyer, the length and level of intrusiveness of this stop was justified and did not violate Hensley's fourth amendment rights. The Covington police were entitled to seize evidence obtained during the lawful stop and such evidence was admissible at trial. The Court also stated that once the guns were discovered, the Covington police then had probable cause to arrest Hensley for firearms possession. Although the Court stated that the length of Hensley's detainment was irrelevant once the weapons were discovered, the Court cautioned that the Covington police may have overstepped their fourth amendment authority had they detained Hensley solely on the basis of the flyer until the.St. Bernard police could question him. 90 the Supreme Court held that the Terry rule is applicable to an investigation conducted by a police officer based on an informant's report, rather than on the actual citing of the criminal incident. 9 192 In Adams, the informant told the police officer that Adams was seated with a gun at his waist in a nearby vehicle and possessed narcotics. 93 Acting on this information, the officer approached Adams' car and asked him to get out of the vehicle. 9 4 When Adams responded by rolling down the car window, the officer seized the gun and conducted a search of the car, which uncovered the narcotics. 95 The Adams Court held that in light of the facts available to the officer at the time of the encounter, the search and seizure was both reasonable and lawful. The Supreme Court concluded that the weapon and narcotics seized by the officer were the fruits of a lawful search and were ad-86 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. The Terry Court stated that in determining whether an officer acted reasonably, the standard to be applied was not whether the officer relied on intuition but rather whether the officer relief on "the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience." Id. The facts referred to in the exception appear to be the officer's observations, including unusual conduct by the suspect and any other observations that lead the officer, in light of his experience, to believe that criminal activity may be imminent. 
A. THE EXTENSION OF THE TERRY EXCEPTION INTO THE AREA OF

COMPLETED CRIMES.
The first issue the
996
[Vol. 76 missible at trial. 97 As a result, Adams extended the Teny exception in two ways. First, it illustrated the Court's willingness to permit policemen to act on reliable information supplied by others. 98 Second, and more pertinent to the Hensley decision, the Adams Court implicitly expanded the Terry exception to include investigations of ongoing crimes. 99 Having previously applied the Terry exception to investigations of imminent and ongoing crimes, the task before the Supreme Court in Hensley was to determine whether the exception was equally applicable to the investgation of a completed crime. The Supreme Court disagreed, and rightfully so, with the Sixth Circuit's decision in Hensley holding that the Terry exception was inapplicable to the investigation of completed crimes. 10 0 Although the Sixth Circuit attempted to restrict the Supreme Court's application of the Terry exception to the realm of ongoing offenses by citing Florida v. Royer,1 0 1 the Sixth Circuit's reliance on Royer was misplaced. The Supreme Court in Royer specifically held that an investigative detention is outside the scope of the Terry exception only when it escalates into a prolonged and severely intrusive detention search. 1 0 2 Furthermore, nothing in the Royer decision stated that the Terry exception is confined to the investigation of ongoing crimes.' 0 3 Justice White in Royer explicitly stated that "if there is articulable suspicion that a person has committed or is about to commit a crime" then the Terry exception is applicable. 1 0 4 97 Id. at 146. The Adams Court did not specify whether the information had to come from a civilian or whether officers could rely on information supplied by other officers.
98 See Hensley, 105 S. Ct. at 680. The Hensley Court cited Adams as standing for the proposition that the Teny exception applied to investigation of suspects whom an officer believed "was committing a crime at the moment of the stop." Id.
99 Id. (citing Hensley, 713 F.2d at 224). 100 460 U.S. 491 (1983) . See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text. 101 Royer, 460 U.S. at 507. In Royer, two narcotics agents at Miami International Airport observed Royer and determined that he fit a "drug courier profile." The agents, suspicious that Royer was carrying narcotics, approached Royer and asked him to produce his driver's license and airline ticket. Noting discrepancies in the documents, the agents identified themselves, related to Royer their suspcion, and asked him to accompany them to a small room. There, the officers, having retrieved Royer's luggage, asked Royer if they could search the bags. Without giving his oral consent, Royer produced the luggage key. The search revealed marijuana and Royer was placed under arrest. The trial court convicted him of the felony of possession of marijuana but the appellate court reversed, holding that Royer had been involuntarily detained without probable cause. Moreover, the Court's extension of the Terry exception promotes the governmental interests of solving crimes and apprehending offenders. The Hensley Court balanced these interests against an individual's fourth amendment rights, and correctly concluded that the governmental interests were compelling enough to warrant the extenson of the Teny exception to include investigatory stops of individuals reasonably suspected of having committed completed crimes.1 0 9 The Supreme Court stated that "[t]he law enforcement interests at stake in these circumstances outweigh the individual's interests to be free of a stop and detention that is no more extensive than permissible in the investigation of ongoing crimes."110 Moreover, the Sixth Circuit's conclusion in Hensley that the St. Bernard flyer lacked sufficient facts to justify an investigative stop is inconsistent with other appellate cases which held that an officer may make an investigative stop in reliance on a police bulletin, although he has no personal knowledge of facts warranting the investigation." 1 3
In United States v. Maryland, 1 4 a police department broadcasted a radio message to neighboring law enforcement agencies stating that several individuals were suspected of passing counterfeit bills. 1 5 The message described the suspects and their automobile, and requested that law enforcement officers aid in the arrest of the suspects.1 6 After hearing the broadcast, a policeman from another department spotted the suspects' automobile, stopped it, and took the suspects in his patrol car to the local courthouse." t7 Once the officer escorted the suspects to the courthouse, the officer returned to their car, searched it, and found counterfeit bills hidden near where one of the suspects sat.""
The suspects argued that the officer's search was not incident to a lawful arrest because probable cause did not exist to justify the arrest. 1 19 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, however, held that the radio message contained information sufficient to supply probable cause for the suspect's arrest. 120 In addition, the court held that the arresting officer was "entitled to rely on the radio bulletin issued by the neighboring department. 119 Id. at 569. The Court's decision noted that the interdepartmental arrest occurred "only a short time after" the crime was committed. Id. It is unclear, however, whether the Court gave weight to the time differential or whether this fact was merely collateral to the officer's citing of the automobile described in the message. 
999
Similarly, in United States v. Impson, 122 the Fifth Circuit held that "[w]e do not question in the least the correctness of the principle that the searching-arresting officer can act on the basis of information of which he has no personal knowledge which has been relayed to him by police transmission facilities."' 23 These cases indicate that interdepartmental reliance is not a novel concept in law enforcement procedure. The Supreme Court's favorable view towards interdepartmental reliance does not, therefore, represent a radical departure from conventional police practice, as illustrated by Maryland and Impson.
In Hensley, the Supreme Court discussed two cases, Whiteley v. Warden1 24 and United States v. Robinson, ' 25 to support its approval of interdepartmental reliance, where the issuing police department's report is based on a reasonable suspicion grounded in specific articulable facts.1 2 6 The Robinson decision focused directly on the connection between the reasonable suspicion standard and law enforcement's reliance on interdepartmental communications. In Robinson, a police officer's actions were in reliance on a police radio dispatcher's message asking that he be alerted to the interstate transportation of a possible stolen car. 127 The only information related by the dispatcher was a license plate number. The officer knew no facts about the alleged crime, nor was he aware of the basis for the dispatcher's report.
12 8 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the arresting officer's search of the supposedly stolen vehicle was illegal and the evidence discovered during the search was inadmissible at trial.' 29 The Ninth Circuit's opinion stated, however, that "[i]f the dispatcher himself had founded suspicion, or if he had relied on information from a reliable informant who supplied him with adequate facts to establish founded suspicion, the dispatcher could properly have delegated the stopping function" to the officer making the stop.1 3 0 The Ninth Circuit's opinion explicitly conveys its approval of interdepartmental reliance that is grounded in a reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts by the issuing department. The Hensley Court cited with approval the Robinson Court's theory on interdepartmental reliance.' 3 1
Applying the Robinson opinion of interdepartmental reliance to the facts of Hensley, the Supreme Court properly concluded that the details contained in the informant's statement to Officer Davis of the St. Bernard Police Department provided Davis with facts sufficient to evoke a reasonable suspicion that Hensley had been involved in the armed robbery. 13 2 The Court held, therefore, that the Covington officers' investigatory stop and search of Hensley was not unlawful and that their attempt to detain him long enough to ascertain whether there was a warrant outstanding for his arrest was a rational procedure characteristic of experienced law enforcement officials.' 33 Furthermore, the Hensley Court concluded that since the stop was lawful, any evidence obtained during the officers' search of Hensley's car was admissible at trial.
1 34
The interdepartmental reliance standard employed by the Supreme Court in Hens/ey is commendable because it serves the governmental interest of effective law enforcement while protecting the fourth amendment rights of those individuals detained by law enforcement officials. On the one hand, interdepartmental cooperation increases the likelihood that crimes will be solved and offenders brought to justice. The Hensley Court exhibited insight regarding these governmental objectives when it observed that, in an age when criminals have ready access to transportation and are likely to flee the investigating department's jurisdictional boundary, interdepartmental cooperation is a necessity.' 3 5 Yet, the standard's requirement that the report relied upon be the product of the issuing department's reasonable suspicion serves to protect the fourth amendment rights of those individuals detained by police. The Robinson court explicitly stated that the absence of a reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts invalidates a search, thereby rendering any incriminating evidence discovered during the search inadmissible.' 3 6 This requirement undoubtedly will have a deter-rent effect on law enforcement officials, discouraging random stops of individuals that the officers encounter. The Hensley Court's holding that police in one department may rely on a report issued by another department-provided that the flyer is grounded in a reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts that the individual wanted was involved in a completed felonyl 37 -strikes a tempered balance between two compelling societal concerns. Most importantly, the Hensley decision manages to promote both of these concerns without sacrificing either to the other.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's analysis of Hensley sets a new and valuable standard in the area of law enforcement. The Court's ruling that an investigation of individuals suspected of committing completed felonies does come within the purview of the Teny exception serves to aid law enforcement officials in apprehending wanted felons. Although the Court recognized the fourth amendment's general probable cause requirement, the Court also recognized the competing governmental interests of bringing offenders to justice and solving crimes. Both constitutional guarantees and effective police practices are important societal concerns and must be protected.
The Hensley decision also strengthens law enforcement practices by permitting one department to rely on information issued by another department, provided the latter's correspondence reflects a reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts that the person wanted was involved in a completed crime. This standard of interdepartmental reliance promotes the governmental objectives of solving crimes and apprehending offenders, while safeguarding the fourth amendment rights of individuals detained by law enforcement officials.
